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I. INTRODUCTION
Our tort system reflects the character and values of our society.'
Like any moral code, it strives to bring out the best in citizens while
discouraging the worst. To achieve these goals, the system must be fair
and comport with common sense; be predictable, so that citizens can
conform their conduct to the requisite norms; and encourage productive
behavior and demand personal accountability.
However, today's tort system falls short of these goals.? It has
drifted away from fault-based compensation to a system of social wel-
fare. 3 It is sometimes unfair and too often encourages antisocial be-
* Managing partner of the law firm of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell in Tallahassee,
Florida. The author is a graduate of Eckerd College and the University of Virginia School
of Law. He represents the Florida Chamber of Commerce and affiliated business interests
in tort reform efforts before the Florida Legislature. He wishes to express his appreciation
to his law partner, Ms. Mary Chaisson, and Mr. David Ramba of the Florida League of
Cities, for their invaluable assistance in preparing this article.
1. See William A. Worthington, The "Citadel" Revisited. Strict Tort Liability and the Pol-
icy of Law, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 & n.8 (1995). A "tort' is a "private or civil wrong or in-
jury, including action for bad faith breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy
in the form of an action for damages." BLACIS LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 262-63.
3. Worker's compensation (FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1997)) and automobile no-fault (FIL.
STAT. §§ 627.730-.7405 (1997)) are two examples of social welfare programs that have dis-
placed parts of Florida's tort law system. In these and other similar instances, the welfare pro-
gram guarantees compensation without regard to fault, in exchange for relinquishing tradi-
tional common law rights to sue in tort for personal injuries. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v.
Smith, 359 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1978); American Freight Sys., Inc. v. Florida Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Under Florida's present tort system,
however, some claimants can receive compensation without regard to the fault of the defen-
dant, as in the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, or collect 100% of economic damages
141
142 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
havior. For example, Florida's system permits a drunken driver to re-
cover damages primarily caused by his own drunkenness, if another
person also had some minimal responsibility for an accident.4 It per-
mits a plaintiff to sue for a "defect" in a product fifty or more years
old-well after the useful life of that product.' It often requires a tort-
feasor to pay more than his or her fair share of a loss.6 It also permits
one to be punished repetitively for a single mistake.7
In 1997, the Florida Legislature proposed the Florida Accountability
and Individual Responsibility Liability Bill (FAIR Bill). The FAIR Bill
would place limits on vicarious liability, create a statute of repose for
products, establish an alcohol and drug defense, and impose common-
sense limits on the imposition of punitive damages. The FAIR Bill
passed the House Financial Services Committee in the 1997 session.
Under the applicable House rule,9 the bill remains pending during the
1998 session. The FAIR Bill, and other tort reform proposals, will be
the subject of intense debate in 1998.
In Part II, this Article demonstrates that prudent tort reform is
needed to ensure Florida's economic productivity and enhance the lives
of individual citizens. Part III explains how modern Florida tort law
has fallen out of balance and become unpredictable, costly, and unfair.
Part IV highlights the FAIR Bill's proposed reforms and shows how
these particular reforms will create a more just and predictable liability
system. Finally, the Article concludes that the FAIR Bill is a step in the
right direction for ensuring a fair and just tort system.
II. THE BENEFITS OF TORT REFORM
Tort liability imposes significant costs on society. 0 In 1991, the na-
tion spent $131.6 billion on tort litigation, representing 2.3% of our
against a defendant only 5% at fault for those damages. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1997). Yet,
these same claimants retain all traditional common law remedies in tort. See id.
4. See Livingston v. Smalley Transp. Co., 603 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); City
of Tamarac v. Garchar, 398 So. 2d 889, 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), overruled on other grounds,
502 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1987) (finding that the jury never clearly determined fault because they
were not provided with intoxication instructions).
5. Florida repealed its 12-year-old statute of repose in 1986 by deleting it from section
95.03(2), Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT § 95.03(2) (1985); see also Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp. v. Corcoran, 679 So. 2d 291, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen
L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses
Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9 J.L & CoM. 167, 175 & n.47 (1989).
6. See Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 1993) (holding that joint and several
liability is abolished only as to noneconomic damages).
7. See W. R. Grace & Co.--Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1994) (holding that
prior punitive damages assessed against the defendant do not preclude subsequent awards
against the same defendant for injuries arising from the same conduct).
8. Fla. I-B 2117 (1997).
9. See FiA. H.R. RuLE 96 (1996-98).
10. See Kirk W. DiUllard, Illinois' Landmark Tort Reform: The Sponsor's Policy Explana-
tion, 27 LOY. U. CM-. L.J. 805. 809 nn.1, 16-17 (1996).
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gross domestic product." In one recent year alone, state court juries in
the seventy-five largest urban areas awarded over $2.7 billion to plain-
tiffs.'" Studies report that citizens pay a "tort tax" of $1200 per individ-
ual, or nearly $5000 for a family of four. 13 Some have estimated that
twenty percent of the cost of a ladder and fifty percent of the cost of a
football helmet is attributable to tort liability.14 The cost of the tort sys-
tem has risen sharply in the past thirty years" and "at a pace far faster
than in any other modern, competitive economy."
6
As tort costs have increased, so too has the unpredictability of li-
ability, to the detriment of American commerce.' 7 Product manufactur-
ers have become more risk averse, sacrificing research and innovation
for the safe harbor of product uniformity.' Socially beneficial products
and services have not been developed, or have been withdrawn from
the market for fear of tort lawsuits.'9 American competitiveness in the
worldwide market has suffered as well.20 These inequities have in-
creased the unpredictability, and therefore the cost, of the system, de-
terred commercial innovation, and stifled economic productivity.2'
Tort liability imposes similar costs in Florida. A recent survey shows
that Florida's small businesses-the economic engine of the state-are
significantly intimidated by the mere threat of liability.2 Eighty-five
percent of those surveyed believe that liability laws improperly favor
those who bring the suit.23 Sixty percent have real concern about the
possibility of a tort suit.2 4 The concern is so acute that Florida busi-
nesses would rather be subject to a tax audit or OSHA inspection than
a liability suit.2" Similarly, Florida businesses would rather lose their
best customer or most valued employee than have to defend a tort law-
11. Seeid. at809n.17.
12. See BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECr 24 (1996).
13. See Dillard, supra note 10, at 809 n.16.
14. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 250; Dillard, supra note 10, at 811 n.27.
15. See PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABiLITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 3 (1991).
16. Id. (citation omitted).
17. See id. at 7-8.
18. See id.
19. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 245-49.
20. See Cortese & Blaner, supra note 5, at 173-86.
21. See id.; Worthington, supra note 1, at 230, 245-53.
22. See MASON DIXON & HANK FISHKIND, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT
BUSINESS SURVEY OF FLORIDA BUSINESS (1997) (presented at the FAIR Press Conference on
April 15, 1997) (on file With Fla. St. U. L. Rev., Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter SURVEY]. The
survey was taken from 772 business owners and executives from Florida firms with less than
500 employees. The interviews were conducted by telephone from March 24 through April 10,
1997. See also HENRY H. FISHKIND, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TORT
REFORM ON FLORIDA'S ECONOMY (1997) (on file with Fla. St. U. L. Rev., Tallahassee, Fla.)
[hereinafter EXECIIVE SUMMARY].
23. See SURVEY, supra note 22, at 7.
24. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 2.
25. See id. at 3; see also SURVEY, supra note 22, at 4.
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suit.2 Close to 200 businesses indicated that they have withheld, failed
to develop, or refused to market products or services to limit exposure
to liability suits.2 7 These small businesses consider tort reform as one of
the three most important actions the Florida Legislature could take on
behalf of business .28
Empirical data confirm the benefits of sensible tort reform. A 1994
Stanford University study analyzed the impact of tort liability reforms
on economic performance, using data from seventeen industries in
states that had enacted tort reform. 9 The study focused on whether re-
forms had a significant impact on a state's productivity and employ-
ment.30 The findings are notable. They demonstrate that a state's adop-
tion of additional liability-reducing reforms generally enlarges levels of
output per worker and employment in a broad range of industries.31 In
contrast, a state's adoption of liability-increasing reforms generally
causes lower productivity and employment.3 2 The study concludes that
liability-decreasing reforms help a state's economy, and liability-
increasing reforms hinder a state's economy.3
Prudent tort reform will not pose a threat to public safety, as critics
suggest, or create tort immunity for wrongdoers.3 4 To the contrary, a
balanced system will enhance public safety, punish wrongdoers for
negligent conduct, and demand personal responsibility.3
The present system does little to advance public safety. Florida's
citizens are not protected by a system that permits drunk drivers and
drug users to collect thousands for their own wrongdoing. 3 They are
not protected when the law discourages small businesses and product
manufacturers from developing newer, safer products for fear of law-
26. See ExECULvE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 3; see also, SURVEY, supra note 22, at 5.
27. See SURVEY, supra note 22, at app. 5.
28. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 2. Dr. Fishkind's summary of findings
showed that almost 68% of the businesses surveyed named liability reform as one of the top
three issues to be addressed by the Legislature, and another 31% ranked it among the top 10
issues.
29. See THOMAS J. CAMPBELL ET AL., LIABILITY REFORMS' CAUSES AND ECONOMIC
IMPACTS: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 27 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper,
No. 4989, 1995).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.; see also Dillard, supra note 10, at 816 n.43.
34. See George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY:
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184 (1988); Fla. HB 2117 (1997). The FAIR Bill does not create
absolute bars to liability or cap damages. The statute of repose is, at most, a temporal limi-
tation to suit, not a complete bar to liability. See id.
35. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Educ. Servs., PCB 97-06 (1997) (Economic Impact State-
ment of Apr. 14, 1997) (on file with comm.).
36. See, e.g., Livingston v. Smalley Transp. Co., 603 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
(holding that the defendant could be held liable for the accident even though the driver was
50% at fault and there was evidence to suggest that the driver was under the influence of alco-
hol); see also FLA- STAT. § 768.81 (1997).
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suits. 37 All citizens lose when tort liability is based not on fault, but on
how much insurance or savings one has.
3 8
It is little wonder that studies have found that the expansion in tort
liability around the nation has had little impact on consumer safety. A
study by Professor George Priest demonstrated that while the number
of tort suits and insurance premiums rose sharply in the 1980s, injury
rates for consumers and workers, death rates for medical procedures,
and aviation accident rates declined no faster than in the 1970s when
premium costs and the volume of tort suits were much lower.3 9 Stated
more directly, Professor Priest found no empirical evidence whatsoever
that the explosion in tort liability in the 1970s and '80s made society
any safer.4
0
If common sense reforms are enacted, Florida citizens will have a
system that requires compensation for wrongful conduct, that refuses
to reward drunken drivers and drug users, and that encourages busi-
nesses to invent and develop new and safer products and services. It is
the fair thing to do.
III. FLORiDA TORT LAW: A SYSTEM OUT OF BALANCE
In the past thirty years, Florida's judiciary has liberalized and ex-
panded tort liability, in part to remedy perceived historical anomalies.
In so doing, however, the court retained other legal relics that permit
wrongdoers to benefit from their own wrongs and require some tortfea-
sors to pay more than their fair share of a loss. The result is a system
that is unpredictable, costly, and often just plain unfair.
A. Contributory Negligence
Before 1973, Florida applied the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. 41 First adopted in Florida in 1886, the doctrine barred a plain-
tiff from seeking damages for injuries caused by negligence if the
plaintiff was even 1% responsible for that loss.4 2 The supreme court
described it as, "[t]he injury must be 'solely' caused by the negligence
of the defendant. It is not enough that it should be 'essentially' so
caused."43
37. See SURVEY, supra note 22, at App. 5; George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of
Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects and Its Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 31, 31
(1991).
38. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1987).
39. See HUBER & LITAN, supra note 15, at 5.
40. "[1]f courts had been attaching liability on grounds of accident prevention, then claims
and claims payouts would have mirrored the accident rate." Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
41. See Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700, 729 (1886).
42. See id.
43. Id.
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While contributory negligence sometimes yielded harsh results, the
harshness was ameliorated by another common law doctrine-joint and
several liability. Joint and several liability provides that each defen-
dant is liable for the entire damage to the plaintiff, regardless of that
defendant's percentage of real culpability." The doctrine derives from
the principal that "the act of one is the act of all."45 Under joint and
several liability, the liability is "'joint' in that all defendants may be
joined to render compensation for an injury; it is 'several' in that each
defendant is liable for the entire damage amount; and it is 'joint and
several' in that no defendant's liability is extinguished until the plain-
tiffs judgment is completely satisfied." 6 Joint and several liability was
considered a necessary evil under contributory negligence because
principles of causation deemed injuries "indivisible," and there was no
way to determine each tortfeasor's degree of negligence.
47
B. The Illicit Union of Comparative Fault and Joint and Several
Liability
In Hoffman v. Jones,4s the Florida Supreme Court, describing con-
tributory negligence as "unjust" and "inequitable," abolished the doc-
trine in favor of comparative negligence. 9 The court reasoned that the
liability of the defendant should depend upon "what damages he
caused"5 0 because "[i]n the field of tort law, the most equitable result
that can ever be reached by a court is the equation of liability with
fault."51 In addition, the court adopted "pure" comparative negligence,
under which a plaintiff is entitled to collect from each defendant his
proportionate share of damages, regardless of the degree of the plain-
tiffs fault.52 Under this rule, a plaintiff can recover damages caused in
part by his own negligence, even if he is 99% responsible for his inju-
ries.53
The Hoffman Court's laudable goal of equating liability with fault
went unrealized, however, because the court neglected to correct an-
other historical anomaly at the same time-joint and several liability. 4
44. See Pamela Burch Fort et al., Florida's Tort Reform: Response to a Persistent Prob-
lem, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 508-09 (1986).
45. Id. at 508.
46. Id. at 509.
47. See id.
48. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
49. Id. at 437.
50. Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted).
51. Id. at 438.
52. See id. (holding that "[i]f plaintiff and defendant are both at fault, the former may re-
cover, but the amount of his recovery may be only such proportion of the entire damages plain-
tiff sustained as the defendant's negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the plain-
tiff and the defendant).
53. See id. at 439.
54. See id.
[Vol. 25:141
PRO TORT REFORM
Since 1973, comparative negligence has coexisted with joint and sev-
eral liability, often yielding unfair results. Hoffman teaches that a co-
defendant responsible for 10% of a plaintiffs loss should pay only 10%
of the damages."' But this is not the case in a multi-defendant personal
injury case, due to joint and several liability. Even today, a tortfeasor
10% at fault can, under certain circumstances, be forced to pay all of a
plaintiffs damages, or at least a much greater share than his actual
fault warrants."6
The inequity is best illustrated by the decision in Walt Disney World
Co. v. Wood. 7 In Wood, a jury returned a verdict finding the plaintiff
14% at fault, Walt Disney World 1% at fault, and the plaintiffs fiancee
(who was not joined as a defendant) 85% at fault.58 Because joint and
several liability remained in effect at that time, Walt Disney World was
responsible for payment of 86% of the plaintiffs damages. s The su-
preme court, however, declined to abolish joint and several liability.60
In 1986, the Legislature abolished the doctrine with regard to none-
conomic damages, but only partially abolished it for economic dam-
ages.61 Comparative negligence and joint and several liability co-exist
in Florida today, at times requiring persons to pay more than their fair
share of a loss.62
55. See id.
56. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1997).
57. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
58. See id. at 199.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 202.
61. See Tort Reform and Insurance Act, ch. 86-160, § 60, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755
(amending FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1985)). As for noneconomic damages, "each defendant is li.
able for only his own percentage share of noneconomic damages." Smith v. Department of Ins.,
507 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987); see also FIA. STAT. § 768.81(2) (1997). As for economic dam.
ages, "with respect to a party whose percentage of fault equals or exceeds that of a particular
claimant, the court shall enter judgment... against that party on the basis of the doctrine of
joint and several liability." Id. § 768.81(3). Joint and several liability continues to apply to all
actions in which damages (economic/noneconomic) do not exceed $25,000. See FLA. STAT. §
768.81(5) (1997).
62. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1997). In his dissent in Walt Disney World, Justice
McDonald explained the intrinsic unfairness of combining comparative fault with joint and
several liability in Florida's tort system:
The doctrines of joint and several liability and contributory negligence are consis-
tent with each other. Each tortfeasor, as a part of the whole, is liable for the whole.
Comparative negligence, which does not bar, but reduces a recovery to the extent
of individual fault, requires a separation of fault between the injured party and the
other tortfeasors. It would be a mismatch of legal concepts to have a separation
theory for the plaintiffs and joint liability responsibility for defendants. Compara-
tive negligence recognized the ability of a court to determine and apportion dam-
ages in relation to the harm caused. Joint and several, in contrast, presumes the
inability of the judiciary to divide fault among parties. We have now said that we
can. Accordingly, when the comparative negligence doctrine comes into play, as it
did in this case, the law of joint and several liability should be repudiated and each
defendant held accountable for only the percentage of damage determined by the
trier of fact to have been caused by his conduct.
1998]
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In the last three decades, Florida citizens have witnessed other
revolutionary changes in tort liability that have contributed to the im-
balance in this state's tort system. In 1976, the Florida Supreme Court
abolished the requirement of privity in tort and adopted strict liabil-
ity.63 Not long after, the court imposed upon automobile manufacturers
the obligation to make vehicles "crashworthy." 4 The court has also re-
affirmed the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, which departed from
the essential premise of Hoffman and imposed liability without fault.65
In 1985, the Legislature repealed the statute of repose on product li-
ability actions, making manufacturers theoretically liable for products
50, 75, or even 100 years old.66
Not surprisingly, as tort liability expanded, litigation exploded in
Florida. From 1975 to 1995, tort filings in Florida increased by 45%.67
From 1980 through 1994, tort filings increased 43%, while Florida's
population increased by only 28%.6s Expanded liability has been profit-
able for Florida claimants and their attorneys. Between 1991 and 1996,
Florida claimants had a 61% probability of recovering a personal injury
verdict, while the national average was only 50%.69 In 1997, the median
personal injury award in Florida was a whopping 40% higher than the
national median.70
IV. THE FAIR BILL: A FIRST STEP TOwARD SENSIBLE TORT REFORM
During the 1997 legislative session, the House Committee on Finan-
cial Services, chaired by Representative "Sandy" Safley,71 introduced
and ultimately reported favorably on House Bill 2117, the FAIR Bill.
The FAIR Bill is a modest first step toward meaningful tort reform. In
summary, the bill creates a twelve-year statute of repose for product li-
Id. at 202 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
63. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 89 (Fla. 1976) (holding that "a
manufacturer may be liable under the theory of strict liability in tort, as distinct from breach
of implied warranty of merchantability').
64. Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 1981) (holding that because colli-
sions are foreseeable events, "the scope of the liability should be commensurate with the scope
of foreseeable risks").
65. See Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990);
see also Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1959).
66. See FLA STAT. § 95.11 (1997) (providing for a four-year statute of limitation for prod-
uct liability actions, without a statute of repose); see also Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v.
Corcoran, 679 So. 2d 291, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
67. See OsTOM & KAUDER. supra note 12, at 26.
68. See Florida Chamber of Com., Issue Brief- Characteristics of the Disposition of Negli-
gence Cases in Florida, 1980-94, in FLORIDA'S COMPARATIVE FAULT LAW 8-11 (1995) (an eco-
nomic consulting services special report prepared for the Florida Chamber of Commerce).
69. See JURY VERDICT REs. SERV., 1997 FLORIDA VERDICT SURVEY 12 (Lynn Godfrey &
Traci Stocker eds., 1997).
70. See id. at 13.
71. Repub., Clearwater.
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ability actions;7 2 limits vicarious liability for injuries caused by danger-
ous instrumentalities;7 s creates a common sense alcohol and drug de-
fense;74 limits joint and several liability in cases with damages less
than $25,000;71 limits repetitive punitive damages, 76 and clarifies the
wrongful intent required for imposition of punitive damages. 77
A. Statute of Repose
In West v. Caterpillar,7 the Florida Supreme Court adopted strict
liability and greatly expanded the scope of liability for retailers and
manufacturers of products. 79 Dispensing with time-honored concepts of
privity and fault, the court held that a retailer or manufacturer could
be held liable for injuries suffered by a remote user of a product, re-
gardless of the care taken in designing or manufacturing that product,
if the product was found to be "unreasonably dangerous."0 That stan-
dard requires a careful, complex evaluation of the risks of injury posed
by a product, compared with the utility and cost of its design, its use-
fulness to society as a whole, and the ability to make the product safer
at a reasonable cost.8'
Unfortunately, Florida juries are not instructed on the necessary
elements of this analysis. Rather, the jury is summarily instructed that
a product is "unreasonably dangerous" and therefore defective if, by
reason of its design or manufacture, "the product fails to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect.... or if the risk of dan-
ger in the product outweighs the benefits. 8 2 Thus, a finding of defect in
Florida is nothing more than a retrospective second guess about com-
plex, sophisticated design or manufacturing choices made by scientists
72. See Fla. HB 2117, § 2 (1997).
73. See id. § 3.
74. See id. § 4.
75. See id. §8.
76. Seeid.§6.
77. Seeid. § 7.
78. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
79. See id. at 89.
80. Id.
81. See Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1169 (Fa. 1979). Among the
factors that must be considered in this analysis are:
"(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other
and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its
probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge
and normal public expectation of danger (particularly for established products),
(6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect
of instructions or warnings), and (7) the ability to eliminate the danger without
seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expen-
sive."
Id. at 1170 (quoting an uncited article by Dean Wade). See also Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726,
735 (3d Cir. 1976); see generally Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331
(Fla. 1983); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1145-46 & n.9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
82. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CMIL CASES § PL 5 (1997).
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and engineers years before. 83 Stated another way, "Ly]esterday's prod-
ucts are measured against tomorrow's possibilities. 84
Worse, retailers and manufacturers retain virtually unlimited expo-
sure for alleged defects in their products. Under Florida law, a plaintiff
can sue for a defective product even if that product is 50, 75, or 100
years old-well after the product has reached the end of its useful life. 5
Such unlimited exposure is both unfair and unwise. It leaves retailers
and manufacturers unable to predict contingent liabilities and discour-
ages the innovation and introduction of new products.8 6
The problem is real, and one that has caused tangible harm to
Florida's citizens. In 1991, Piper Aircraft of Vero Beach filed for protec-
tion under Chapter Eleven of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, reporting
that the potential for product liability litigation involving older planes
had scared off potential lenders.87 The fifty-four-year-old Florida com-
pany once had more than 3200 employees in four plants; on the day it
sought Chapter Eleven protection, the company had only forty-five em-
ployees.88
The FAIR Bill cures this inequity by reinstating a statute of repose
for product liability actions. It provides that an action claiming a prod-
uct defect must be commenced no later than twelve years after the
product leaves the possession and control of the manufacturer. 89 As the
Florida Supreme Court noted, a statute of repose evinces a "rational
and legitimate" policy that recognizes "perpetual liability places an un-
due burden on manufacturers.se It is based on the common-sense no-
tion that liability should be restricted to a time commensurate with
83. See generally Cortese & Blaner, supra note 5, at 187 & no. 118-121.
84. Worthington, supra note 1, at 247 (citation omitted).
85. Florida's 12-year statute of repose for strict products liability claims was repealed in
1986. See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Corcoran, 679 So. 2d 291, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA
1996); see also Cortese & Blaner, supra note 5, at 175 & n.47.
86. See Cortese and Blaner, supra note 5, at 187-91. A design engineer in Florida is faced
with an intractable dilemma due to this exposure for unlimited product liability. If an engineer
develops a simple, inexpensive way to improve the safety of a 20-year-old widget, the present
state of Florida law discourages that innovation. If a product liability suit is brought seeking
damages for personal injuries arising from use of the 20-year-old widget, the plaintiff lawyer
will use the newer, safer design as proof that the earlier design was "unreasonably dangerous."
Thus, the perpetual risk of liability concerning the older widget creates disincentives to the
improvement of that product. See id.
87. See Piper Aircraft Seeks Chapter 11 Protection, N.Y. TImES, July 4, 1991, at Dl.
88. See id. In 1970, private aircraft manufacturers produced 17,000 planes. In 1987, they
produced less than 1100 planes. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 249. In large part because of
the risk of perpetual product liability in the aircraft industry, thousands of aircraft workers
were laid ofl unemployment in the industry was over 50%, and the cost of liability insurance
averaged $100,000 per plane produced. See W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8
(1991). In response to this liability crisis, Congress passed the General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994, which was signed into law on August 17, 1994. It created an 18-year statute of re-
pose in actions against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft. See General Aviation Revi-
talization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994).
89. See Fla. HB 2117, § 2 (1997).
90. Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985).
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the normal useful life of manufacturer products."91 Key states with
which Florida competes for economic development, such as Georgia 2
and Illinois,9' have similar statutes of repose.
The FAIR Bill's statute of repose will not abolish an injured person's
right to sue for injuries related to the use of a product.9 4 It would limit
only those actions brought for the allegedly defective design or manu-
facture of a product where injuries occur more than twelve years after
the product leaves the possession of the manufacturer.95 A plaintiff will
continue to have the right to sue for the negligent repair of a product,
its negligent use, or negligent alteration of a productY6
B. Vicarious Liability
Section three of the FAIR Bill modifies a historical relic that is in-
consistent with modem tort law-vicarious liability for use of danger-
ous instrumentalities. 97
Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the owner or lessor
of an automobile is held strictly liable for damages suffered by a third
party due to the negligence of the person to whom the owner or lessor
entrusted the automobile. Liability is not based on the owner's negli-
gence or fault in entrusting the vehicle; rather, it is based solely on
ownership of the product and the original consent given to another to
use the product.9 9 The doctrine has been expanded beyond the permis-
sive use of automobiles to golf carts and other products. 00
Florida's application of this doctrine is not in line with the national
mainstream. Prosser and Keeton note that Florida is the only state
that imposes such absolute liability:
91. Id. at 660.
92. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (1997).
93. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-213(c)(1) (West 1997).
94. The statute cannot constitutionally be applied to situations where a person uses or
consumes a product that inflicts injury within the 12-year period (giving rise to an accrued
cause of action), but where injury does not manifest itself until after the period of repose. See
Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 283 (Fla. 1990); Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 397 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 1981); Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659.
95. SeeFla. HB2117, § 2 (1997).
96. See id.
97. See id. § 3.
98. See Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1367 (Fla. 1990);
Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 835-36 (Fla. 1959) (holding the owner of a
car liable when the owner consents to the use of the vehicle "beyond his own immediate con-
tro"); Lynch v. Walker, 31 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1947).
99. See Susco Car Rental Sys., 112 So. 2d at 835-36.
100. See Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1984) (golf carts); Paterson v. Deeb, 472
So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding the owner liable for the conduct of the thief); see also
Gomez v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 596 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Stupak v. Winter
Park Leasing, Inc., 589 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Lambert v. Indian River Elec., Inc.,
551 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Michalek v. Shumate, 524 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1988); Tribbitt
v. Crown Contractors, Inc., 513 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
1998]
152 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
If the owner is not present in the car, but has entrusted it to a
driver who is not his servant, there is merely a bailment, and there
is usually no basis for imputing the driver's negligence to the
owner. It is here that the owner's liability to the injured plaintiff
stops at common law. Only the Courts of Florida have gone the
length of saying that an automobile is a "dangerous instrumental-
ity" for which the owner remains responsible when it is negligently
driven by another. 101
The Florida Supreme Court admitted as much in 1993 in Hertz Corp. v.
Jackson.
102
The doctrine is also fundamentally at odds with modem Florida tort
law. Because liability is gauged by one's status and not one's fault, the
doctrine contravenes Hoffman 0 3 .and the comparative fault statute. 0 4
Because liability is vicarious rather than direct, the doctrine provides
no guidance on how one can avoid or limit potential liability. The result
is liability that is unpredictable (and therefore costly) and unfair.
Not surprisingly, the state's statutory and common law have moved
toward limiting, if not abrogating, the dangerous instrumentality doc-
trine. In 1986, the Legislature abolished the doctrine with respect to
long-term lease arrangements, provided that the lessee obtains certain
levels of bodily injury liability and property damage insurance. 10 5
Perhaps most significantly, only months ago the Florida Supreme
Court adopted negligent entrustment in Florida, under which a prop-
erty owner is liable for injuries to a third person only if the owner was
negligent in entrusting the property to a wrongdoer. 0 This concept,
unlike the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, is faithful to Florida's
efforts to equate liability with fault, and is a much fairer way to impose
liability against owners of personal property.
Under the FAIR Bill, the owner of personal property would not be
vicariously liable for the negligent operation of the property by another,
provided that the user has or obtains insurance containing limits of not
less than $100,000 and $300,000 for bodily injury, or combined limits of
$500,000.10? This provision would provide a substantial layer of protec-
tion to one injured by the negligent use of someone else's property,
101. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ONTHE LAW OF TORTS 523-24 (5th ed.
1984).
102. 617 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1993) (stating that "[ilt appears that Florida is the only
jurisdiction that imposes... strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who
voluntarily entrusts it to another").
103. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431,438 (Fla. 1973).
104. FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1997).
105. See Act Effective Oct. 1, 1986, ch. 86-229, 1986 Fla. Laws 1771, 1772 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 324.021 (9) (1985)).
106. See Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 22 Fla. L. Weekly S435, S438 (Fla. July 17, 1997)
(finding the store negligent for selling a firearm to an obviously intoxicated customer who sub-
sequently shot the petitioner).
107. See Fla. HB 2117, § 3 (1997).
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while moving Florida law in the direction of equating liability with
fault.
C. Alcohol and Drug Defense
Alcohol and drugs kill with tragic frequency and societal cost. In
1996, there were 973 alcohol- or drug-related fatalities, 23,145 alcohol-
or drug-related injuries, and 25,362 alcohol- or drug-related crashes in
Florida. 118
In Florida, the use of alcohol and drugs can also pay. Under the pre-
sent tort system, a drunk driver can be primarily responsible for his
own injuries, but still collect thousands of dollars in compensation if
another person was partially responsible for that loss. 09 Take, for ex-
ample, a two-car collision at an intersection. Drunk Driver is young and
severely intoxicated at the time of the accident, with a 3.0 blood alcohol
level. Sober Driver is an elderly, usually careful driver. Drunk Driver
runs a red light and careens into the intersection at high speed. Sober
Driver enters the intersection at a reasonable speed, but fails to react
quickly enough to avoid the collision. Drunk Driver is rendered a quad-
riplegic, while Sober Driver escapes with a broken leg. The jury finds
Drunk Driver 90% responsible, incurring damages of $4 million. Sober
Driver is 10% responsible for the accident, with damages of $20,000.
Under this scenario, the drunk driver would recover a judgment
against the sober, elderly citizen for $382,000. This result rewards
criminal conduct and is unconscionable.
Section four of the FAIR bill is an alcohol and drug defense that in-
fuses some common sense into the system and prohibits compensation
under these circumstances. 01 This provision would permit a defendant
to assert drug or alcohol impairment of the plaintiff as a defense if the
plaintiff was under the influence of drugs or alcohol and if, as a result
of being under the influence, the plaintiff was more than 50% at fault
for his own injuries."' The defense would not apply to over-the-counter
or prescription drugs."'
This proposal is simple and fair. It embodies Florida's strong public
policy against the use of drugs and alcohol" 3 It requires an individual
to assume responsibility for his own wrongful conduct.
108. See DEPARTMENT OF HIGH. SAF. & MOTOR VEH., TRAFFIC CRASH FACTS 5 (1996).
109. See, e.g., Livingston v. Smalley Trans. Co., 603 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 3d DCA
1992).
110. See Fla. HB 2117, § 4 (1997).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Kitchen v. K-Mart, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S435, S438 (Fla. July 17, 1997) (applying
negligent entrustment to a store for selling a firearm to an obviously intoxicated customer who
subsequently shot the petitioner, thus equating liability with fault).
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D. Comparative Fault/Joint and Several Liability
In Fabre v. Marin,"4 the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the un-
derlying premise of Hoffman-that liability should equate with fault."'
There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault
paying 100% of the loss, and there is no valid social policy that should
compel defendants to pay more than their fair share of the loss. Plain-
tiffs now take the parties as they find them. If one of the parties at
fault happens to be a spouse or a governmental agency and if by reason
of some competing social policy the plaintiff cannot receive payment for
his injuries from the spouse or agency, there is no compelling social
policy that requires the co-defendant to pay more than his fair share of
the loss.116
Unfortunately, Florida tort law still falls short of this goal. Joint and
several liability persists in all actions where damages are less than
$25,000. In cases involving more than $25,000 in damages, joint and
several liability still applies to economic damages in some instances." 7
Section eight of the FAIR Bill partially rectifies this inequity by ap-
plying Florida's partial abolition of joint and several liability to smaller
cases with total damages of less than $25,000.11s A person should pay
only her fair share of a loss, no matter how big or small the case.
E. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are, simply put, "out of control."" 9 The punish-
ment is erratic, often does not fit the offense, and fails to distinguish
negligent from truly egregious conduct.12 0 An editorial from The Wash-
ington Post presented it this way: "Legislation is needed because puni-
tive damages are wildly unpredictable, so arbitrary as to be unfair and
awarded without any guidance to juries, which simply pick numbers
114. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
115. See id. at 1185.
116. See id. at 1187 (citing Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867,874 (Kan. 1978)).
117. See FLA_ STAT. § 768.81(3) (1997).
118. See Fla. HB 2117, § 8 (1997).
119. See VICTOR E. SClHWARTz, AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, COMMENTS BEFORE THE UNITED
STATES SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 2 (1995) (summarizing Mr. Schwartzis testimony be-
fore Congress on the imposition of punitive damages) (on file with author) [hereinafter
SCHWARTrZS SENATE COMMENTS]; Dillard, supra note 10, at 807 n.10; Robert D. Cooter, Puni-
tive Damages for Deterrence7 When and How Much?, 40 ALA_ L. REV. 1143, 1145-46 (1989);
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REv. 975,975-76,
987-88 (1989) [hereinafter Ellis, Punitive Damages]; Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Fur-
ther Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability
Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 940-41 (1989); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L REV. 1, 55-60 (1982)
[hereinafter Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency].
120. See SCHWARTZS SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 1-2; see also Dillard, supra
note 10, at 807 n. 10.
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out of the air."121 The inequity in modern punitive awards has even
prompted the United States Supreme Court to become active in the
field, despite a long-held reluctance to intervene in state law issues.1
22
1. The Expansion of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are not intended to compensate a claimant. They
are awarded solely for the purpose of punishing truly egregious conduct
and deterring others from similar misconduct.'23 Their existence is de-
rived from public policy, not individual entitlement. The Florida Su-
preme Court made that clear in 1992:
Unlike the right to compensatory damages, the allowance of pu-
nitive damages is based entirely upon considerations of public pol-
icy. Accordingly, it is clear that the very existence of an inchoate
claim for punitive damages is subject to the plenary authority of
the ultimate policy-maker under our system, the legislature. In the
exercise of that discretion, it may place conditions upon such a re-
covery or even abolish it altogether.'24
Forty years ago, punitive damage verdicts were unusually rare. 2 '
Times have changed. Both the frequency of punitive claims and the
magnitude of punitive awards have increased dramatically since
then.126 From 1968 to 1971, in the states of Florida, California, Texas,
New York, and Illinois, ninety-one punitive damage awards were af-
firmed on appeal, totaling $1.4 million. 127 Twenty years later, between
1988 and 1991, the same states had 433 punitive damage awards af-
firmed on appeal, totaling $342.9 million. 28 "By all measures, punitive
damage award amounts increased dramatically between 1985-1989
and 1990-1994."129 In addition, the frequency of punitive claims has af-
fected the settlement process, both increasing the litigation rate and
increasing the ultimate magnitude of settlements. 30
This explosion in punitive damage awards is attributable to at least
two factors. First, while punitive damages were historically limited to a
narrow class of intentional torts such as battery and trespass, courts in
121. Editorial, Trial Lawyers' Triwumph, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1996, at A16.
122. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct 1589 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991);
Browning-Ferris Ind. v. Kelco Disposal., Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
123. See Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1986).
124. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1992) (citation omitted).
125. See GEORGE L. PRIEST, COMMENTS BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES TORT REFORM 2 (1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter
PRIEST's SENATE COMMENTS].
126. See id.
127. See STEPHEN M. TURNER ET AL., WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES EXPLOSION: FACT OR FICTION? 2, 4 (1992).
128. See id.
129. ERIK MOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985 40 (1996).
130. See PRIEST'S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 2.
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modern times have expanded punitive liability for less than intentional
misconduct. 31 The standards governing this liability are at best fuzzy,
at worst, incomprehensible. 132 For example, in Florida a jury might be
told that punitive damages are appropriate to punish "wanton" con-
duct.' 33 Few jurors understand what that standard means (or, just as
importantly, what it does not mean) and even fewer citizens can dis-
cern how to conform their conduct to avoid committing "wanton con-
duct."'134 The result is wildly erratic and unpredictable punitive
awards.135
Second, courts have begun to impose repetitive awards against a de-
fendant for a single course of conduct, particularly in the field of prod-
uct liability.3 6 The policies underlying punitive damages, and society as
a whole, are poorly served by punishing a defendant time and again for
a single course of conduct. Federal Circuit Judge Henry Friendly noted
in 1967 that "we have the greatest difficulty in perceiving how claims
for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the
nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill. 137 In fact, overkill is
precisely what has occurred. Multiple windfall recoveries of punitive
damages deplete a defendant's limited resources and endanger the
ability of future claimants to recover even compensatory damages."18
Even the threat of repetitive punitive awards can drive a company
into bankruptcy. Dow-Corning Corporation is a recent example. When
breast implant recipients began to experience unexplained symptoms
of malaise, plaintiffs' attorneys throughout the country flooded the ju-
dicial system with lawsuits, claiming that silicone breast implants were
defective. 1 9 Faced with years of future litigation, including multiple
punitive damages awards, Dow-Corning offered to create a fund of $2
billion-at the time the largest single settlement fund in modern
131. See SCHWARTZS SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 4; see also Adams v. Whit-
field, 290 So. 2d 49, 51-52 (Fla. 1974) (holding that evidence of legal malice, not actual malice,
is needed to justify a punitive damage award).
132. See Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 531-32 (Fla. 1974)
(holding that punitive damages were available for "evil-doing," "outrageous highhandedness,"
or for conduct committed with "malice, moral turpitude, [or] wantonness") (citation omitted).
133. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES § PD(a)(2)(3) (1997) [herein-
after 1997 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; see also Glicksteil v. Setzer, 78 So. 2d 374, 375 (Fla.
1955).
134. 1997 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 133; see also Glickstein, 78 So. 2d at 375.
135. See Jeffries, supra note 119, at 139; see also Cooter, supra note 118, at 1145-46; Ellis,
Punitive Damages, supra note 119, at 975-76, 987-88; Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency, supra note
119, at 55-60; Wheeler, supra note 119, at 940-41.
136. See W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1994); see also
SCHWARTIZ!S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 1, 4.
137. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
138. See SCHWARTZ'S SENATE CoMMENTS, supra note 119, at 5-6.
139. See Joseph Nocera, Dow-Corning Succumbs, FORTUNE, Oct. 30, 1995, at 137; Richard
Hazelton, The Tort Monster That Ate Dow-Corniag, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at A21.
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American history. at that time 140 In order to preserve the integrity of
this fund and to maintain its financial viability, Dow-Corning sought
class action certification to foreclose repetitive punitive awards by opt-
out claimants . 14  Nonetheless, Dow-Corning succumbed to Chapter
Eleven bankruptcy in 1995, putting the settlement fund in jeopardy, or
at least delaying the availability of these billions to pay compensatory
damages. 4
2
Even worse, despite thousands of pending claims, there is precious
little, if any, scientific proof that silicone implants are defective. 4 The
United States District Court for the District of Oregon convened an in-
dependent panel of scientists and medical experts to assess the proba-
tive value of plaintiffs' proffered evidence that silicone implants cause
auto-immune disease. 144 After exhaustive analysis by the independent
panel and full presentations by plaintiffs' and defendants' experts, the
judge concluded that there was no competent scientific evidence to
show that breast implants cause auto-immune disease. 4 1 Yet, because
of the mere pendency of thousands of costly lawsuits, as well as the cor-
rosive threat of multiple punitive damage awards in the future, Dow-
Coming Corporation remains mired in bankruptcy. 146
140. See Memorandum of Law of Defendants Dow-Corning Corporation and Dow-Corning
Wright Corporation in Support of Their Motion for Certification of a Mandatory Class Action
as to Punitive Damages, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litigation, No. CV 92-P-
10000-S (N.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 1994).
141. See id.
142. See Voluntary Petition, In re Dow-Corning Corp., No. 95-20512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
May 15, 1995); see also Nocera, supra note 139, at 137; Hazelton, supra note 139, at A21.
143. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D. Or. 1996).
144. See id. at 1392-94.
145. See id. at 1394, 1414-15.
146. See id. at 1394, 1402, 1407, 1411, 1417; see also, Nocera, supra note 139, at 137; Ha-
zelton, supra note 139, at A21.
The breast implant controversy is far from over. On July 30, 1997, Bankruptcy Judge Arthur
J. Spector ruled that common issue causation trials should be held in Dow-Corning's Chapter
11 case to resolve the threshold question of whether scientific evidence supports claims that
breast implants cause disease. See Court Issues Opinion That Common Issue Causation Trials
Should Resolve Legal Debate on Breast Implants, FINANCIAL NEWS, July, 30, 1997, at 8. No
causation trial has yet been scheduled. On August 25, 1997, Dow-Corning announced a pro-
posed reorganization plan, which could provide $2.4 billion for resolving breast implant claims,
depending upon the number of claimants voting to accept the plan. See Dow-Corning An-
nounees New Plan of Reorganization to Resolve Chapter 11 Filing, FINANCIAL NEWS, Aug. 25,
1997, at 2. As more people vote in support of the plan, individual settlement amounts increase,
because less money is required for the trial process. See id. The Bankruptcy Court has not yet
ruled on this plan of reorganization. See id.
On August 19, 1997, a jury in Louisiana rendered a verdict against Dow Chemical, one of
Dow-Corning's parents, finding that Dow Chemical had failed to investigate or had concealed
evidence concerning the health risks of breast implants. See Spitzfaden v. Dow Coming Corp.,
No. 92-2589 (Orleans Parish Civ. Dist. Ct. 1997). That jury verdict did not, however, address
the question of whether breast implants caused the pervasive disease claimed by plaintiffs. On
December 3, 1997, a Louisiana judge decertified the suit as a class action. See Pamela Coyle,
Implant Suit in Pieces After Ruling Cases Not Alike, Judge Decides, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PIcAYUNE, Dec. 2, 1997, at Al.
1998]
158 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The devastating effect of punitive damages extends beyond the cor-
porate entity. Bankruptcy forces employees to lose their jobs. Small
businesses that rely on the company for income lose their business and
also their employees. Economic harm to the company also affects
shareholders, pension funds, and investors, who face a loss of their
savings.
The threat of multiple punitive damage awards has an equally det-
rimental impact on settled cases. Judge Weis of the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit recently wrote:
[T]he potential for punitive awards is a weighty factor in settle-
ment negotiations and inevitably results in a larger settlement
agreement than would ordinarily be obtained. To the extent that
this premium exceeds what would otherwise be a fair and reason-
able settlement for compensatory damages, assets that could be
available for satisfaction of future compensatory claims are dissi-
pated. 1 47
Similarly, in repetitive or mass tort litigation, the threat of repetitive
punitive damage awards makes a comprehensive settlement more diffi-
cult and limits the ability of a claimant to recover quickly for his in-
jury. 48 The Director of the Federal Judicial Center has written that
"[blarring successive punitive damage awards against a defendant for
the same conduct would remove the major obstacle to settlement of
mass tort litigation and open the way for the prompt resolution of the
damage claims of many thousands of injured plaintiffs."149
2. Reform Is Needed, Even if Punitive Damages Are Few
The infrequency of punitive damage awards does not diminish their
inequity or adverse impact on society. It is not the frequency of punitive
damages awards that is the problem, but rather the erratic, unpredict-
able, and repetitive nature of these awards. 150 The result is a chilling
effect on innovation, American competitiveness, and the introduction of
socially beneficial products.' 5
1
Moreover, statistics show that the total dollar amount of punitive
damages is substantial, both in Florida and across the nation. A recent
Rand Corporation study notes that "punitive damage award amounts
increased dramatically between 1985-1989 and 1990-1994. '152 It also
concluded that "[b]ecause punitive damage awards, have increased so
147. Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1398 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., dissenting).
148. See Nocera, supra note 139, at 137; Hazelton, supra note 139, at A21.
149. William W. Schwarzer, Punishment Ad Absurdum, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1991, at 116.
150. See ScHwART'ZS SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 2.
151. See Jeffries, supra note 119, at 139; see also Coiter, supra note 119, at 1145-46; Ellis,
Punitive Damages, supra note 119, at 975-76, 987-88; Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency, supra note
118, at 55-60; Wheeler, supra note 119, at 940-41.
152. MOLLER, supra note 129, at 40.
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substantially, punitive damages represent a large portion of overall to-
tal damages awarded-approximately half in some jurisdictions.' 53 In
Florida, juries have awarded punitive damages over 150 times since
1989, totaling $481 million.154 Data also show that from 1992 to 1994
Texas, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee affirmed punitive damage
awards on appeal in 158 cases.155 Thus, in Florida, California, and the
four states mentioned above, there have been at least 561 punitive
damage awards since 1989.
3. Sensible Reform
The FAIR Liability Act takes some prudent initial steps to return
equity to the award of punitive damages in Florida. First, the FAIR Bill
would prohibit repetitive punitive damage awards for the same course
of conduct, if the defendant established before trial that punitive dam-
ages had been awarded in a prior action in Florida involving the same
act or course of conduct.15 6 A repetitive award would nonetheless be
permitted if the court makes specific findings of fact that the earlier
award was insufficient to punish the defendant's behavior. 157
Second, the FAIR Bill clarifies the type of misconduct that should be
punished. M A plaintiff must prove that the misconduct was inten-
tional, which is defined as conduct which the defendant knew to be
wrongful, or conduct that the defendant knew had a high probability of
causing injury. 15 9
Third, the FAIR Bill requires that the plaintiff prove the right to
punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence, 60 a standard that
has been embraced by a number of other states, including California,
Texas, Kentucky, and North Carolina. 6 ' Because the imposition of pu-
nitive damages is penal in nature and tantamount to a fine, it should
be imposed only under an enhanced burden of proof, just as is required
when one is subject to a governmental fine or a criminal penalty.
153. Id.
154. See GEORGE MEROS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES SURVEY: 1989-1996 (1997) (compiling infor-
mation from the punitive damage statistics in the FLORIDA JURY VERDICT REPORTER from
1989-1996) (on file with author).
155. See SCHWARTZ!S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 16.
156. See Fla. 11B 2117, § 7(2)(a) (1997). The Florida Supreme Court noted in W. R. Grace
& Co.-Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 505 (Fla. 1994), that only Congress could resolve de-
finitively the problem of repetitive punitive damage awards, due to the limited reach of indi-
vidual state legislation. However, in the absence of a comprehensive federal solution, an in-
cremental improvement in Florida is at least a step in the right direction.
157. See Fla. HB 2117, §7(2)(b) (1997).
158. See id. § 6.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See ALA_ CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Michie 1996); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3294 (West 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (Michie 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. §
11-1-65 (1)(a) (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(b) (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (1997);
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537 (1996); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a) (West 1997).
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V. CONCLUSION
It all comes down to fairness and common sense. It is not fair to
permit a drunk driver to collect damages for his own misconduct. It de-
fies common sense to permit one to claim a defect in a product that is
thirty or fifty years old. It is wrong to base liability on the mere owner-
ship of property rather than one's fault, and it is just as wrong to make
a wrongdoer pay more than his or her fair share of a loss. It offends ba-
sic notions of justice to punish one repetitively for a single act of mis-
conduct.
Florida can have a system that protects the safety of its citizens and
provides fair compensation to injury victims, yet demands socially re-
sponsible conduct and personal accountability. House Bill 2117 is a
prudent first step in the right direction.
